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Abstract 
 
In light of the increasing inequality in many countries, this paper analyzes redistributive 
charitable giving from the rich to the poor in a model of optimal nonlinear income taxation.  
Our framework integrates (i) public and private redistribution, (ii) the warm glow of giving 
and stigma of receiving charitable donations, and (iii) status concerns emanating from social 
comparisons with respect to charitable donations and private consumption. Whether charity 
should be taxed or supported largely depends on the relative strengths of the warm glow of 
giving and the stigma of receiving charity, respectively, and on the positional externalities 
caused by charitable donations. In addition, imposing stigma on the mimicker (which relaxes 
the self-selection constraint) strengthens the case for subsidizing charity. We also consider a 
case where the government is unable to target the charitable giving through a direct tax 
instrument, and we examine how the optimal marginal income tax structure should be 
adjusted in response to charitable giving. Numerical simulations demonstrate that the 
quantitative effects of the aforementioned mechanisms can be substantial. 
 
Keywords: Conspicuous consumption, conspicuous charitable giving, social status, optimal 
income taxation, warm glow, stigma 
JEL Classification: D03, D62, H21, H23 
                                                          
* The authors would like to thank participants at the workshop on Status, Social Beliefs, and Public Policy in 
Berlin 2017 and the IIPF conference in Glasgow 2019, as well as Spencer Bastani, Katharina Jenderny, Tobias 
König, Dylan Moore, and Tomas Sjögren for helpful comments and suggestions. Research grants from the Bank 
of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation, the Swedish Council for Working Life and Social Research, and the 
Swedish Tax Agency (all of them through project number RS10-1319:1), as well as from the Swedish Research 
Council (ref 2016-02371), are also gratefully acknowledged. The usual disclaimer applies. 
 2 
1. Introduction 
 
While redistribution from the rich to the poor is a core governmental task in modern societies, 
income and wealth inequalities have increased sharply in many countries in recent decades, 
and are moreover typically expected to increase further.1 At the same time, people donate 
substantial amounts of money to charities,2 where currently only a small fraction serves the 
aim of helping the poor, suggesting that private charity could play an increasingly important 
rule over time to combat increasing inequalities. Since redistribution via the tax system is 
typically associated with social costs, due to incentive effects, one may wonder whether 
private redistribution through charitable giving ought to be encouraged via the tax system in 
order to play a more important role? Indeed, private charitable giving is already now 
explicitly supported in many countries, e.g., through tax deductions, effectively implying 
subsidization of charity relative to private consumption. Are there good reasons for this policy 
in cases where the charitable giving aims at reducing the inequality and/or poverty and, if so, 
under what conditions?3 What would an optimal policy look like? The objective of the present 
paper is to answer these questions based on a model of optimal nonlinear income taxation in 
which there is redistribution both through the tax system and via charitable giving. In doing so, 
we will address a variety of mechanisms that may underlie society’s tradeoff between 
charitable giving and private consumption such as the social status attached to donations and 
consumption, respectively, the warm glow of giving, and the stigma of receiving charity.   
 
Our study contributes to the literature in at least four ways. First, we integrate redistributive 
charitable giving from donors to recipients into a discrete version of the Mirleesian optimal 
tax problem. This means that our approach differs in a fundamental way from earlier studies 
on charitable giving and optimal redistributive taxation, where charitable giving is typically 
described as voluntary contributions to a public good. Second, our study is also the first to 
analyze how an optimal tax policy ought to respond to the potential social stigma faced by the 
receivers of charity. That is, we do not only model the warm glow of giving on behalf of the 
donors, but also acknowledge a corresponding negative stigma effect for the receivers, such 
                                                          
1 According to Saez and Zucman (2016), the share of total US wealth of the top 1 percent increased from below 
25 percent in 1978 to above 40 percent in 2012; during the same period, the share of total wealth of the top 0.1 
percent roughly tripled, while the share of the top 0.01 percent increased by more than a factor five. 
2 For example, the total U.S. charitable giving amounted to about 430 Billion USD or slightly above 2 percent of 
GDP in 2018 (Giving USA Foundation, 2019). 
3 We will solely focus on this kind of charitable giving since we believe that the value added in terms of 
additional insights of a more general setting in this regard would be limited in relation to the increased 
complexity. As described below, there are many policy-related papers focusing on charitable giving in terms of 
voluntary contributions to a public good.  
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that the receivers would have preferred to obtain the same consumption possibilities through 
some other means than charity (in our case through the general income tax system). Third, 
together with our companion paper Aronsson, Johansson-Stenman, and Wendner (2019), the 
present study contributes by integrating simultaneous status motives for charitable giving and 
private consumption in the analysis (the difference between the two papers will be described 
below). Fourth, we distinguish between a case where the government is able to target the 
charitable giving through a direct tax instrument and a case where it is not, which will be 
described more thoroughly below. 
 
While a broad perspective adds complexity, we believe that these elements and their 
interactions are crucial in order to understand the incentives facing donors and receivers of 
charity, and more generally the key mechanisms underlying the optimal tax treatment of 
charitable giving. Indeed, it turns out that assumptions regarding the warm glow of giving and 
the stigma of receiving charity, the strength of relative giving concerns versus the strength of 
relative consumption concerns, and transaction costs associated with charitable giving, 
respectively, are all key to understanding whether charity should be taxed or supported.  
 
We follow the conventional theory of charitable giving in assuming that individuals 
experience a warm glow from donating. This is an important assumption and means that an 
individual A derives utility from donating a certain amount to a poor individual B, while A 
does not derive any utility if individual C donates to B or the government transfers money to 
B. By contrast, an individual motivated by pure altruism would only care about the utility of 
individual B and not about his or her own contribution to it. The warm glow of giving 
assumption is supported by strong empirical evidence; see in particular Andreoni (1989, 
1990).  
 
We also follow a more recent strand of literature in assuming a prestige motive behind 
charitable giving, i.e., that charitable giving signals status (see, e.g., Glazer and Konrad, 1996; 
Harbaugh, 1998a; Cartwright and Patel, 2013). Empirical and experimental evidence 
demonstrates that donations are typically higher if they are observable than if they are not, 
and that the way in which they are reported also affects their size (e.g., Harbaugh, 1998b; 
Andreoni and Petrie, 2004; Alpizar et al., 2008). Furthermore, charitable giving seems to 
increase with the contributions made by other people (Andreoni and Petrie, 2004; Alpizar et 
al., 2008), suggesting that charitable giving resembles a positional good.  
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In addition to the status motive behind charitable giving, a vast empirical literature shows that 
relative income and consumption concerns are important for individual well-being, suggesting 
a status motive also behind private consumption. For instance, happiness research has 
repeatedly found that people derive well-being from their own income or consumption 
relative to that of referent others, and quasi-experimental research shows that a substantial 
fraction of a person’s utility gain from increased consumption might be due to the person’s 
resulting increase in relative consumption  (see, e.g., Johansson-Stenman et al., 2002; Solnick 
and Hemenway, 2005; and Carlsson et al., 2007, for evidence based on questionnaire-
experimental research, and Easterlin. 2001; Blanchflower and Oswald. 2004; Ferrer-i-
Carbonell, 2005; and Clark and Senik, 2010, for evidence based on happiness research). This 
is directly relevant in the context of charitable giving, since relative consumption concerns 
typically influence the decisions to donate and, therefore, the optimal policy responses to 
charitable giving. 
 
By analogy to the warm glow of giving, we assume that recipients of charity suffer from 
social stigma or shame in the sense that they derive disutility from receiving charity (for a 
given consumption level). While poverty in itself can also be associated with shame, as noted 
by Sen (1983, 1999), there is ample empirical evidence from sociological studies of social 
stigma related to receiving charity and targeted welfare benefits; see, e.g., Chase and Walker 
(2013) and Baumberg (2016). There is also an economics literature on the implications of 
social stigma. For instance, Moffitt (1983) defines welfare stigma as the corresponding lack 
of self-respect due to an inability to support oneself, while Besley and Coate (1992) and 
Kleven and Kopczuk (2011) analyze how social stigma may matter for public policy. 
Moreover, a robust finding in the literature on subjective well-being is that unemployment 
tends to imply reduced well-being, also when correcting for the income loss that 
unemployment gives rise to (e.g., Clark and Oswald, 1994; Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004). 
This is clearly at odds with the assumptions normally made in economics, since 
unemployment implies more leisure, but it is consistent with the idea of a stigma associated 
with living on welfare. While one can argue that there may be a stigma component also from 
favorable treatment through the tax system, we will focus on the stigma of receiving 
charitable donations in what follows, by assuming that potential charity recipients prefer 
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redistribution through the tax system over receiving the same funds through charitable 
donations.4  
 
Several earlier studies, including Feldstein (1980), Warr (1983), Roberts (1987), Saez (2004), 
Diamond (2006), Blumkin and Sadka (2007), and Aronsson, Johansson-Stenman, and 
Wendner (2019), have examined optimal tax policy in various settings in economies where 
charitable giving is modelled in terms of voluntary contributions to a public good. An 
important task of the government is then to simultaneously decide how much of the public 
good it should provide directly and the extent to which it should support private contributions. 
Saez (2004) integrates charitable giving into a model of optimal linear taxation and 
characterizes the optimal subsidy (or tax) attached to voluntary contributions to the public 
good. Diamond (2006) extends the analysis to a model of optimal nonlinear taxation and 
shows that voluntary contributions to the public good by those with the highest earning ability 
lead to higher welfare through a relaxation of the incentive constraint.  
 
Similar to our study, Blumkin and Sadka (2007) and Aronsson, Johansson-Stenman, and 
Wendner (2019) analyze status-related motives behind charitable giving, albeit in very 
different contexts. In the model by Blumkin and Sadka, status signaling constitutes the only 
motive for charitable giving. They examine the welfare effects of introducing a tax on 
charitable giving under an optimal linear income tax and find that the optimal tax on such 
giving is non-negative. Aronsson, Johansson-Stenman, and Wendner (2019), a companion 
paper to the present one that shares some important model assumptions, analyze the optimal 
tax treatment of voluntary contributions to a public good, to which the government also 
contributes through public revenue. That paper compares the policies decided on by a 
conventional welfarist government (which respects all aspects of consumer preferences and 
bases the social objective thereupon) with the policies chosen by different paternalist 
governments (which do not respect welfare effects from social comparisons and the warm 
glow of giving, respectively). A major finding is that welfarist and paternalist governments 
may choose quite similar policies despite that their motives for influencing voluntary 
contributions to public goods differ in fundamental ways.    
 
The studies closest in spirit to ours are Atkinson (1976) and Kaplow (1995, 1998), in the 
sense that these papers also consider pure redistribution in terms of private consumption 
                                                          
4 It is possible to interpret the stigma from receiving charity in our model as a net stigma effect compared with 
the stigma of receiving the same amount through the tax system. 
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through charitable gifts. Kaplow analyzes model economies where the donor is altruistic, and 
concludes that the equilibrium implies under-provision of donations relative to a first-best 
social welfare optimum (based on a utilitarian social welfare function), since each donor will 
only take into account their own utility associated with the donation (regardless of whether 
the donation per se is motivated by altruism or warm glow) and not the utility of the receiver.5 
Therefore, a Pigouvian subsidy would take the economy to the first-best optimum. Atkinson 
uses a similar framework to examine the conditions under which tax deductions for charitable 
contributions are preferable to a tax credit, and vice versa. Yet, none of these studies attempt 
to integrate charitable giving into a framework of optimal redistributive taxation.  
 
Albeit based on a very different model, we follow Atkinson and Kaplow in considering pure 
redistribution, in terms of private consumption, through charitable donations from the rich to 
the poor, or more specifically in our model setup from individuals with high earning ability to 
individuals with low earning ability.6 This approach is arguably relevant for at least two 
reasons. First, most earlier studies on the tax treatment of charitable donations referred to 
above have focused on public goods aspects and thus paid less attention to aspects associated 
with redistribution. Second, it allows us to examine the interesting question of whether – and 
if so to what extent – the government should redistribute via the tax system, and to what 
extent it should support private redistribution through gifts. We assume that the government 
redistributes by using a nonlinear income tax, possibly combined with a tax instrument 
directly targeting charitable giving, and that earning ability is private information. Diamond 
(2006) and Aronsson, Johansson-Stenman, and Wendner (2019) also consider models with 
nonlinear taxation, yet they focus on contributions to public goods instead of pure 
redistribution. As in Diamond (2006), we find that a subsidy for charitable giving works as a 
mechanism to relax the self-selection constraint, although for a completely different reason: 
the stigma of receiving charity makes mimicking less attractive. 
 
Our paper also contributes to a strand of literature dealing with optimal taxation in economies 
where people derive well-being from their relative consumption compared with referent 
others. A major issue in this literature has been to examine how positional concerns ought to 
affect the structure of marginal income taxation and/or commodity taxation, which a number 
                                                          
5 The donor only recognizes the recipient’s preferences indirectly (since the donor derives utility from the well-
being of the recipient), whereas the social welfare function also directly reflects the preferences of the recipient. 
6 See Auten et al. (2002) and Clotfelter (1992, 2014) for extensive empirical analyses of the redistributive effects 
of charity. 
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of studies have addressed based on various models and tax instruments.7  It is now well 
established that a negative consumption externality caused by such comparisons calls for 
higher marginal tax rates and more redistribution compared with conventional models of 
optimal taxation (where people do not care about their relative consumption).8  Yet, this 
literature addresses neither the consequences of positional concerns in terms of redistributive 
charitable giving nor the optimal tax policy implications thereof, which are major issues in the 
present paper. 
 
In summary, the present paper integrates pure redistribution through charitable giving into a 
framework of optimal redistributive income taxation by simultaneously examining warm-
glow of giving, transaction costs, status concerns, and social stigma of receiving charity. This 
contribution is significant for at least four reasons: First, the analysis of several different 
motives for redistribution through charitable giving makes it possible to pin down more 
clearly the crucial conditions under which charitable giving should be supported or not. 
Second, if individuals try to signal status through both consumption and charitable giving – as 
the evidence presented above seems to suggest – the joint policy implications ought to be 
addressed simultaneously in the same framework. Indeed, our results show that relative 
consumption concerns directly affect the optimal policy targeted at charitable giving, which 
suggests that policies targeting different positional externalities may interact in important 
ways. Third, we offer a broad perspective on the tax policy implications of charitable giving 
by distinguishing between a case where the government can influence charitable giving 
through a direct tax instrument and one where it can not. This distinction is practically 
relevant: whereas many countries rely on direct tax incentives (such as various deduction 
schemes) to influence charitable giving, some others do not. It is therefore important to 
compare the optimal tax policies under a full set of tax instruments (including a direct 
instrument targeting the level of charitable giving) with the optimal tax policy that would 
follow in the absence of such an instrument. A setting where the government lacks a direct tax 
instrument for targeting charitable giving is also interesting more generally as it exemplifies a 
realistic case where the government has fewer effective tax instruments than variables it 
wishes to influence. This may be due to an inability of perfectly observing charitable giving 
                                                          
7 See, e.g., Boskin and Sheshinski (1978), Layard (1980), Oswald (1983), Dupor and Liu (2003), Aronsson and 
Johansson-Stenman (2008, 2010), Eckerstorfer and Wendner (2013), and Kanbur and Tuomala (2013). 
8 A corrective tax element of similar magnitude typically follows if the government is paternalist in the sense of 
not respecting the consumer preference for relative consumption. Although such a government is not concerned 
with externality correction, it would like each individual to behave as if the preference for relative concerns were 
absent. In turn, this calls for a corrective tax element closely related to the positional externality; see Aronsson 
and Johansson-Stenman (2018). 
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by the government, or due to political restrictions. Fourth, by using an optimal income tax 
model with information asymmetries, we are able to relate the tax policy implications of 
private redistribution through charitable giving more closely to the modern literature on 
optimal redistributive taxation. Thus, our approach differs from Atkinson (1976) and Kaplow 
(1995, 1998), who did not formally address redistribution through optimal taxation. In 
addition to the added realism, allowing for nonlinear taxation has the obvious advantage over 
more restrictive tax instruments in that the results are straightforward to interpret: tax wedges 
relate directly to information limitations and externalities in our model instead of to an 
amalgam of these motives for taxation and an arbitrary linearity restriction. In this sense, our 
study also complements Diamond (2006) and Aronsson, Johansson-Stenman, and Wendner 
(2018) by examining other aspects of charitable giving than they did. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a baseline model where consumers 
differ in earning ability, which is private information, while both income and charitable 
giving are observable to the government. As we simplify by distinguishing between only two 
ability types, we also assume that high-ability individuals are the sole contributors to charity 
and that all low-ability individuals receive an equal share of these gifts.9 Very briefly, we 
show in Section 3 that charity may either be taxed or subsidized at the margin in the second-
best optimum, depending on the relative strengths of the warm glow of giving and stigma 
from receiving charity, respectively, and on the positional externalities caused by charitable 
donations. We also show that positional consumption externalities directly affect this 
marginal tax/subsidy if charitable giving is associated with transaction costs. 
 
In Section 4, we relax the assumption that the government can control charitable giving 
through a direct instrument. This is primarily motivated by the fact that many countries, for 
whatever reason, simply do not use any direct tax incentives related to charitable giving. 
Regardless of the reasons for this (e.g., due to political or administrative arguments and 
restrictions), it is thus important to analyze how the absence of a direct tax instrument affects 
the optimal marginal income tax structure. The income taxes will then also work as indirect 
instruments for controlling charitable giving, which affects the marginal tax rate of the high-
ability type. Yet, the sign of this tax rate is in general ambiguous (even if we were to assume 
that relative consumption concerns per se motivate a higher marginal income tax rate); we 
give a detailed characterization of the mechanisms underlying the optimal marginal tax rates.  
                                                          
9 Thus, our model is an extension of Stiglitz’ (1982) two-type model of optimal income taxation. 
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In Section 5, we present extensive numerical simulations. These illustrate some of the most 
important theoretical results presented in Sections 3 and 4, and also quantify how the 
marginal tax and redistribution policies vary with key parameters of the model based on 
explicit functional form assumptions. Section 6 concludes the paper, and the Appendix 
presents the proofs and mathematical results that support the analysis in the main text.  
 
2. A Model with Social Comparisons and Charitable Giving 
 
Consider an economy comprising N individuals, of whom 1n  are of a low-ability type (type 1) 
and 2n  are of a high-ability type (type 2). This distinction refers to earning ability, which we 
interpret to mean that high-ability individuals earn a higher before-tax wage rate than low-
ability individuals. Following Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2008), each individual of 
ability type i (i=1,2) derives utility from their own absolute consumption, ic , and leisure time, 
iz , as well as from their own consumption relative to a reference consumption level, 
i ic c c   . The reference consumption level is given by the average consumption in the 
economy as follows: 10 
 
1 1 2 2n c n c
c
N

 . (1) 
Individuals also derive utility from their net charitable giving, ig , such that each individual 
prefers to give rather than receive charity for a given consumption level. Those who give to 
charity experience a warm glow effect, whereas those who receive charity face a stigma effect. 
In addition to pure warm glow, donors care about their relative contribution, i.e., how much 
they give compared with other contributors, whereas those who receive charity analogously 
care about how much they receive compared with other recipients. In other words, each 
individual cares about 
i i ig g g   , where ig  is the average net contribution of type i. Since 
all individuals of type i are identical, it follows that 
i ig g  in equilibrium. This means that 
the warm-glow effect of the absolute donation is not the only motive for charitable giving; 
individuals also derive utility from giving more than their referent others. By a symmetrical 
                                                          
10 The difference comparison, where each individual’s relative consumption is given by the difference between 
the individual’s own consumption and the reference consumption level, is commonly used in the literature (e.g., 
Galí, 1994; Akerlof, 1997; Ljungqvist and Uhlig, 2000; Bowles and Park, 2005; and Aronsson and Johansson-
Stenman, 2008, 2010, 2014). A quotient formulation of the relative consumption (as in Boskin and Sheshinski, 
1978; Layard, 1980; Abel, 2005; and Wendner and Goulder, 2008) would give the same qualitative results in 
terms of policy incentives. 
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argument, receivers of charitable donations do not only face a direct stigma effect attached to 
the absolute donation, but may also derive disutility by receiving more than others. 
 
We will solely focus on the case where, in equilibrium, high-ability individuals contribute to 
charity and low-ability individuals receive charitable donations. We also assume that there is 
a transaction cost associated with charity such that the total amount received by low-ability 
individuals is less than the amount spent on charitable giving by high-ability individuals 
(although we will also consider the limit case of zero transaction costs). For the low-ability 
individuals to receive 2g  dollars, the high-ability individuals will have to spend 2 2( )g g  
dollars, where 2( ) 0g   is the transaction cost of giving to charity.11 The marginal resource 
cost is assumed to be non-negative, 
2 2 2( ) ( ) / 0g g g g     . A natural interpretation is 
that a higher amount donated typically requires the household to collect more information on 
presumptive charities. 
 
2.1 Preferences and Behavior  
We assume that the utility function facing any individual of ability-type i takes the following 
form: 
 ( , , , , ) ( , , , , )
i i i i i i i i i i i iU v c z g c g u c z g c g    . (2) 
The function ( )iv   defines utility as a function of the individual’s own consumption, leisure, 
and net charitable giving, respectively, as well as of the individual’s relative consumption and 
relative net charitable giving. ( )iv   is strictly quasi-concave, increasing in ic  and iz , and non-
decreasing in ig , ic , and ig . The function ( )iu   is a reduced form that helps shorten some 
of the notation. Equation (2) implies the following relationships between ( )iu   and ( )iv  : 
0i i ic c cu v v   , 0
i i
z zu v  , 0
i i
c cu v   , 0
i i i
g g gu v v   , and 0i
i i
gg
u v   , where 
subscripts denote partial derivatives. 
 
Let us also consider a less general, leisure separable version of the utility function written as 
follows (if based on the reduced form utility formulation in equation [2]):  
     ( ( , , , ), )i i i i i iU V h c g c g z .         (3) 
                                                          
11 Since many options are available for charitable donations, this assumption is clearly reasonable. In addition, 
such a cost is also interesting from the perspective of policy incentives, as it contributes to intertwine the policies 
used to correct for positional consumption externalities and positional gifts externalities.  
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The leisure separable utility function in equation (3) implies that the marginal rates of 
substitution between , ,i ic g c , and ig are all independent of leisure. Note that while the utility 
function may still vary between types, the sub-utility function h is the same among types. 
Leisure separable utility functions play an important role in the literature on optimal taxation. 
It is thus useful to compare the results derived from the general utility function in equation (2) 
with those that follow from the leisure separable utility function.  
 
In our two-type setting, high-ability individuals contribute to charity and low-ability 
individuals receive charitable donations.12 Note that the charitable donation received by each 
low-ability individual is given by 1 2 2 1/g n g n  . The individual budget constraint facing 
each type can then be written as  
 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1/ ( ,0) 0,w l g n n c T w l     (4a) 
    
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2( ) ( , ) 0,w l c g g T w l g           (4b) 
where il  denotes work hours, defined as a time endowment (normalized to unity) less the 
time spent on leisure, i.e., 1i il z  , and iw  denotes the hourly before-tax wage rate. The 
function ( , )i i iT w l g  is a general tax function through which the tax payment depends on both 
income and charitable giving. Thus, we assume that there is no tax on receiving charity, such 
that 1 1 1 1 1( , ) ( ,0)T w l g T w l . 
 
 An individual chooses consumption and labor supply, as well as giving if being a high-ability 
type, to maximize utility given by equation (2) subject to the budget constraint in equations 
(4a) and (4b), while treating the reference consumption, c , reference giving, 
ig , wage rate 
per unit of labor, iw , and the parameters of the tax system (including the structure of marginal 
tax rates) as exogenous. In addition to equations (4a) and (4b), an interior solution satisfies 
the following first-order conditions for work hours: 
  , 1 , 1, 2
i i
i i iz z
z c wli i i
c c c
u v
MRS w T i
u v v
    

, (5) 
and the following first-order condition for charitable giving: 
                                                          
12 Instead of assuming that all low-ability individuals receive charitable donations, an alternative would be to 
assume that they differ in their preferences for charitable donations (such as in the stigma perceived), meaning 
that only some of them will accept donations in the end. Yet another alternative would be to assume that 
charitable donations are allocated by lottery among the low-ability individuals. Both of these assumptions would 
increase the analytical complexity of the model, while the main mechanisms driving the results would be the 
same as below. 
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2 2 2
2 2
, 2 2 2
1
g g g
g c g g
c c c
u v v
MRS T
u v v




    

.  (6) 
i
wlT  is the marginal income tax rate facing each individual of ability-type i, and 
2
gT  is the 
marginal tax (if positive) or subsidy (if negative) on charitable giving faced by high-ability 
individuals. 
 
Turning to the production side of the economy, we follow much earlier literature in assuming 
for both ability types a linear technology with labor of as the only input, and that the labor 
market is competitive. Consequently, the marginal labor productivities, as measured by the 
before-tax wage rates, are fixed.13  
 
2.2 The Problem of the Government 
We assume that the government is able to observe income and charitable giving at the 
individual level, while earning ability (as measured by the before-tax wage rate) is private 
information. This means that the government can (i) tax income according to a nonlinear 
schedule and (ii) directly tax or subsidize charitable giving. In Section 4, we consider a more 
restrictive case where the government lacks a direct instrument for taxing or subsidizing 
charitable giving, although it can still implement a nonlinear income tax. We also assume that 
the government wants to redistribute from the high-ability to the low-ability type. This means 
that we must add a self-selection constraint, such that high-ability individuals (weakly) prefer 
the allocation intended for their type over the allocation intended for the low-ability type. By 
using 1 2 2 1/g n g n   and 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 1( ) / /g g g n g g n n g n         , the utility function 
of a potential mimicker, denoted by a hat,14 is given by  
 
2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1
1 1 2 2 12 22 1
ˆ ˆ ( ,1 , / , ), /
( ,1 , / , , /ˆ )
U v c l n g n c n g n
u cc l n g n n ng


     
  
, 
where 1 2/w w   denotes the relative wage rate and 
1l  represents the mimicker’s labor 
supply. The potential mimicker is a high-ability individual who chooses to earn the same 
income as the low-ability type. Furthermore, since charitable giving is observable, a potential 
mimicker will receive as much charity as the true low-ability individuals. Consequently, the 
mimicker will be subject to the same stigma and relative stigma effects. Thus, if expressed in 
terms of the function 2 )(v   in equation (2), the self-selection constraint can be written as 
                                                          
13 This property simplifies the calculations; it is not important for the optimal tax treatment of charitable giving. 
14 Note that the mimicker and the true high-ability type share a common utility function. The hat symbol just 
allows us to separate them in a simple way. 
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2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 12ˆ( , , , , ) ( ,1 , / , c , / )v c z g c g v c l n g n n g n        . (7) 
The economy’s resource constraint is given by 
 
2 2 2 2
1 1
( )i i i i
i i
n w l n c n g
 
   . (8) 
Equation (8) means that output is used for private consumption and the transaction cost 
associated with charitable giving. The direct transfer of charitable giving washes out of the 
resource constraint, as the donations are just a flow of resources from the high- to the low-
ability type. 
 
We consider the general social objective of reaching a Pareto-efficient allocation by 
maximizing the utility of the low-ability type subject to a minimum utility level for the high-
ability type and to the self-selection and resource constraints in equations (7) and (8). 
Furthermore, the government internalizes the positional externalities by taking into account 
that c  and 
2g  are endogenous. The socially optimal resource allocation solves the following 
problem: 
 
1 2 1 2 2
1 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1
, , , ,
2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 1
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1
( , , / , , / )
( , , , , ) ( )
ˆ( , , , , ) ( ,1 , / , , / )
c c l l g
i i i i i
i i
Max L v c z g n n c n g n
v c z g c g U n w l n c n g
v c z g c g v c l g n n c n g n
  
 
 
    
 
         
 
          
  , (9) 
subject to 1 1 2 2( ) /c n c n c N   and 2 2g g . The parameter 2U  represents a fixed minimum 
utility level for the high-ability type, while the Lagrange multipliers refer to the minimum 
utility restriction ( ), the resource constraint ( ), and the self-selection constraint ( ). The 
social first-order conditions for an interior solution are as follows: 
  1
1
1 1 2 2 1ˆ ˆ 0c c c c cc
n
L v v v v n L
N
          , (10) 
   2
2
2 2 2 0c c cc
n
L v v n L
N
         , (11) 
 
 1
1 2 1 1ˆ 0z zlL v v n w       , (12) 
 
 2
2 2 2( ) 0zlL v n w        , (13) 
 
 2
2 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 2ˆ( ) / / ( ) 0g g g ggL v v n n v n n n g          . (14) 
In equations (10) and (11), cL  denotes the partial welfare effect of increased reference 
consumption, c , given by 
 
1 2 2ˆ( )c c c cL v v v         .  (15) 
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The right-hand side of equation (15) is ambiguous in sign, since an increase in c  reduces the 
utility for both the true ability types (which contributes to lower welfare) and the mimicker 
(which contributes to higher welfare). 
 
3. Optimal Taxation 
 
In this section, we derive and present the optimal marginal tax rates by comparing the social 
first-order conditions in equations (10)–(14) with the private first-order conditions given in 
equations (5) and (6). To simplify the presentation of the results, we start by considering a 
simplified version of the model where the transaction cost of charitable giving is zero. In this 
case, the marginal tax/subsidy attached to charitable contribution will be shown to only reflect 
the warm glow of giving and stigma of receiving charity as well as the positional gift 
externality; it does not directly depend on the positional consumption externality.    
 
As will be shown, the policy rules for marginal taxation (of income and charitable giving) 
depend on the extent to which the relative consumption and relative charitable giving, 
respectively, affect individual well-being. It is, therefore, instructive to introduce the 
following degrees of consumption positionality, i , and gifts positionality, i :  
 
i
i c
i i
c c
v
v v
 



, (16) 
              
i
gi
i i
g g
v
v v





 ,          (17) 
where 0 , 1i i    by the assumptions made earlier. The degree of consumption 
positionality measures the share of the marginal utility of consumption arising from an 
increase in relative consumption (e.g., Johansson-Stenman et al., 2002).  
 
Similarly, the degree of gifts positionality is measured as the share of the marginal utility of 
charitable giving arising from an increase in relative charitable giving. Thus, 2  reflects the 
share of the utility gain for a high-ability individual of an additional dollar spent on charitable 
giving that is attributable to increased relative giving (compared with other high-ability 
individuals). Correspondingly, low-ability individuals who receive charity will experience a 
utility decrease (for a given consumption level) for two reasons: due to an increased absolute 
amount of charity received and due to an increased amount of charity received relative to 
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what others receive. The parameter 1  reflects the share of the utility decrease attributable to 
the increased relative charity received. 
 
Finally, we also define the average degree of consumption positionality, 
1 1 2 2( ) /n n N    , which reflects the marginal positional consumption externality per unit 
of consumption, and an indicator of the difference in the degree of consumption positionality 
between the mimicker and the low-ability type, 2 1 2ˆ ˆ( ) / ( )d cu N      . Quasi-
experimental research estimates   to be in the 0.2–0.5 range (see, e.g., Johansson-Stenman et 
al., 2002; Clark and Senik, 2005; Carlsson et al., 2007; and the overview given in Wendner 
and Goulder, 2008). Despite the empirical evidence for status signaling and/or positional 
concerns with respect to charitable giving mentioned in the introduction, we are not aware of 
any direct estimate of the degree of gifts positionality. 
 
3.1 Optimal Marginal Income Tax Rates 
The policy rules for marginal income taxation take the same form irrespective of whether 
charitable giving is costly. It is straightforward to show (see the Appendix) that the optimal 
marginal income tax rates are given as follows (for i=1, 2): 
 ( , ) [1 ] [1 ][1 ]
1
d
i i i i i i i
wl d
T w l g

    

     

 . (18a) 
In the leisure separable case, i.e., given preferences according to equation (3b), 2 1ˆ   such 
that 0d  , and equation (18a) reduces to 
 ( , ) [1 ]i i i i i iwlT w l g       .  (18b) 
The variable i  is a short notation for the marginal income tax formula faced by type i in the 
standard two-type model, in which there are no concerns about either relative consumption or 
charity. Note that the marginal income tax rates in (18a) are identical to the ones derived by 
Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2008) in a model without charitable giving. The reason 
equation (18a) applies here as well is that the government can control charitable giving 
through a direct tax instrument, meaning that charitable giving will not change the policy rule 
for marginal income taxation. As we show in Section 4, without a direct tax instrument for 
influencing the level of charitable giving, equation (18a) would no longer apply.  
 
Briefly, the policy rule for marginal income taxation can be decomposed into three 
components. The first, i , denotes the policy rule for marginal taxation that would be 
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implemented in the absence of any positional consumption externality. This component is 
typically positive for the low-ability types and serves to relax the self-selection constraint by 
exploiting that the low-ability type attaches a higher marginal value to leisure than a potential 
mimicker does, while it is zero for the high-ability type under the assumption of a fixed 
relative wage rate. 15  The second component on the right-hand side of equation (18a) 
represents a corrective tax element and depends on the average degree of positionality,  , 
which is a measure of the positional consumption externality per unit of consumption. Note 
that this effect is scaled down by 11 1   for the low-ability type, since the fraction of an 
additional unit of income already taxed away for other reasons does not give rise to any 
externalities. Finally, the third component reflects how the government exploits differences in 
the degree of positionality between the mimicker and the (mimicked) low-ability type to relax 
the self-selection constraint. If a potential mimicker is more positional than the low-ability 
type ( 0d  ), the government can relax the self-selection constraint through a policy-induced 
increase in the level of reference consumption, c , which, in turn, constitutes an incentive to 
implement a lower marginal income tax rate than otherwise. By analogy, if the low-ability 
type is more positional than a potential mimicker ( 0d  ), there is a corresponding motive to 
increase the marginal income tax rate beyond the level represented by the sum of the first two 
terms. These mechanisms are discussed at length in Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2008) 
and will not be discussed further here. 
 
3.2 Optimal Marginal Tax/Subsidy Rates for Charity without Transaction Costs 
We will now turn to the marginal tax/subsidy on charitable giving. To simplify the 
presentation and interpretation, we begin with the case most commonly analyzed in the 
literature, where there are no transaction costs of giving, i.e., where 
2( ) 0g g   for 
2g . 
Immediately from equation (14), we obtain the following social first-order condition for 
charitable giving: 
 
2 1 2 1 2ˆ( ) / 0.g g gv n n v v       (19) 
 
Equation (19) implies that the social marginal utility of charitable giving (the left-hand side) 
is equal to a “net marginal stigma cost,” i.e., the social marginal stigma cost imposed on the 
low-ability type, 
1 0gv  , adjusted for the social marginal benefit of imposing stigma on the 
mimicker, 
2ˆ 0gv  , which contributes to relax the self-selection constraint. It is worth noting 
                                                          
15 See, e.g., Stiglitz (1982). 
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that the social marginal benefits and costs of charitable giving are measured with the indicator 
of relative giving, 2g , held constant, since the externalities that relative concerns about 
charity give rise to are internalized in the social optimum. 
 
In the absence of any stigma effect, in which case 1 2ˆ 0g gv v  , an interior social optimum (if 
it exists) would imply 2 0gv  . If being a receiver of charity is associated with stigma, and if 
the self-selection constraint is not binding ( 0  ), the first-order condition (19) means 
2 0gv  , i.e., a lower level of charitable giving due to the marginal utility cost of stigma for the 
low-ability type. This stigma effect is intuitive. Yet, if the self-selection constraint is binding 
(  l > 0 ), the stigma effect on the mimicker relaxes the self-selection constraint. As a 
consequence, more charitable giving is optimal (i.e., 
2
gv  is lowered by the term 
2ˆ
gv ).  
 
By noting that equation (19) requires 
1 2ˆ 0g gv v  , the marginal tax/subsidy on charitable 
giving is characterized as follows: 
 
Proposition 1. Without transaction costs, the optimal marginal tax/subsidy rate for charitable 
giving can be written as 
 
1 2
2
2
ˆ1
1
(1 )
g g
g
v v
T



 

, (20a) 
  
where 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2ˆˆ ˆ ˆ( ) / (1 ) / (1 )c c c c c cv v v v v v             . In the leisure separable case 
where the utility function takes the form of equation (3), equation (20) simplifies to read 
11
2
2 1
1
1
1
g
g
c
v
T
v



 

.       (21) 
 
Proof: See the Appendix. 
 
To interpret Proposition 1, we begin with the leisure separable case and by noting that the 
policy rule in equation (21) coincides with the policy rule that would apply under first-best 
conditions where the self-selection constraint does not bind (i.e., if 0  ).16 The ratio 1 1/g cv v  is 
                                                          
16 Under leisure separability (as formalized in equation [3]), there is no distributional benefit of deviating from 
the first-best policy rule in equation (21). In other words, efficiency concerns alone govern the marginal 
tax/subsidy on charitable giving, whereas the marginal income tax policy reflects both the incentive to relax the 
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a low-ability individual’s marginal willingness to pay to avoid the stigma from receiving 
charitable donations, measured with the relative charitable benefit ( 1g ) and the relative 
consumption ( 1c ) held constant. As the government recognizes that relative comparisons are 
pure waste from society’s point of view, 1 1/g cv v  is interpretable as a measure of social marginal 
willingness to pay to avoid stigma. If the relative concerns were absent, such that 1 2 0   , 
this marginal willingness to pay would be the sole determinant of the optimal marginal 
tax/subsidy on charitable giving, i.e., equation (21) would read 2 1 1/ 1g g cT v v  . In the extreme 
case where the stigma effect is so large that individuals of the low-ability type are indifferent 
between accepting and not accepting additional charity, then 1 1/ 1g cv v   and 
2 0gT  , i.e., charity 
should be neither taxed nor subsidized at the margin. In the other extreme case of no stigma 
effect, such that 1 0gv  , it follows that 
2 1gT   , i.e., a marginal subsidy rate of 100 percent.
17 In 
all cases in between these extremes, i.e., where 1 10 / 1g cv v  , it follows that 
21 0gT   , 
implying that charity should be subsidized, although at a rate of less than 100 percent. 
 
The key here is that charitable giving leads to higher utility for the donor (high-ability type) 
without influencing the economy’s resource constraint. Moreover, we know the size of this 
utility increase for the donor: since high-ability individuals give for free, and since they 
maximize their utility by doing so, we know that the marginal benefit of giving an additional 
dollar equals the marginal benefit of consuming it. Thus, if there were no stigma effect, there 
would be an external benefit that is equally large as the donation itself, implying an optimal 
subsidy rate of 100 percent. It is interesting to compare this finding with the results of Kaplow 
(1995), who in his equation (5) derived an expression for the optimal subsidy rate in the 
absence of any social stigma for the receivers. He assumed a utilitarian social welfare 
function and that the subsidy is financed by a lump-sum tax. The result of Kaplow is still not 
a 100% subsidy, however, other than in a special case. This may seem puzzling, since our 
more general Pareto efficiency objective implicitly encompasses all Paretian social welfare 
functions, including Kaplow’s utilitarian one. Yet, it is straightforward to show that this 
discrepancy disappears if one adds an optimal redistributive lump-sum tax in Kaplow’s model, 
thus implying a subsidy rate of 100 percent in his extended model. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
self-selection constraint (which opens up for more redistribution) and the correction for the positional 
consumption externality. That the first-best policy rule for the tax on charitable giving carries over to the leisure 
separable case under optimal income taxation is analogous to results derived for commodity taxation by 
Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) and public good provision by Boadway and Keen (1993). 
17 According to equation (19), to arrive at this extreme (yet interior) solution, 
2
g
v must approach zero when the 
gift reaches a certain level. 
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Yet, the larger the stigma effect, the lower the external benefit and consequently the lower the 
marginal subsidy. In other words, the sole reason for the subsidy is the warm glow of giving. 
Without it, there would only be a social cost of charitable giving due to the stigma effect (the 
transfer of consumption possibilities from high-ability to low-ability individuals does not give 
rise to any social benefit, since the government can redistribute income without costs if the 
self-selection constraint does not bind). We will return to the warm glow issue below.  
 
The multiplier 1 2(1 ) / (1 )    in equation (21) may either scale up or scale down the 
marginal subsidy (or may even turn it into a marginal tax) depending on whether the low-
ability type’s degree of consumption positionality exceeds or falls short of the positional gift 
externality that each high-ability individual imposes on other people of the same type through 
charitable contributions (measured by 2 ). An increase in 1  increases the marginal subsidy 
for charitable giving, ceteris paribus, as it means an even greater tendency for low-ability 
individuals to overestimate the marginal utility of consumption; thus, 1 1/g cv v  overestimates 
each low-ability individual’s marginal willingness to pay for avoiding stigma, and the factor 
11   corrects for this discrepancy. 18  Similarly, an increase in 2  reduces the marginal 
subsidy (or increases the marginal tax) on charitable giving. 19  The intuition is that 2  
represents the fraction of type 2 individuals’ marginal utility of charitable giving that is social 
waste, due to that their concerns about relative contribution lead to an externality, meaning 
that only 21   of an additional dollar contributed gives rise to warm glow. The condition for 
when charity should be taxed, rather than subsidized, then follows from equation (21): 
2
2 1 1
1
1
( )0 iff ( )
1
g g cT v v



   

. 
Let us return to the general policy rule in equation (20a), which is based on the assumptions 
that the self-selection constraint binds ( 0  ) and that leisure is not in general separable in 
terms of the utility function. Compared with equation (21), the most important implication is 
that the government has an incentive to relax the self-selection constraint by exploiting that 
charitable benefits lead to disutility for the mimicker due to the stigma effect.20 However, 
                                                          
18 Note that this component has nothing to do with correction for positional consumption externalities, which is 
accomplished through marginal income taxation. Instead, this component arises because relative consumption 
concerns lead to a discrepancy between the private and social marginal utility of consumption.   
19 This result resembles the finding of Blumkin and Sadka (2007a), although their model differs from ours in 
several important ways. 
20 Diamond (2006) also finds that subsidized contributions may relax the self-selection constraint, although for 
reasons other than those discussed here. In his model, individuals may voluntarily contribute to a public good, 
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consider first an interesting special case of equation (20a), namely the case of no stigma 
effects, which reproduces one of the extreme results discussed in the context of equation (21): 
 
Corollary 1. Without transaction costs, and in the absence of any stigma effects, the optimal 
marginal tax/subsidy rate for charitable giving can be written as 
 2 1gT   , (20b) 
 
This result follows immediately from equation (20) if 2 1ˆ 0g gv v   . The intuition is again that 
charitable giving leads to higher utility for the donors without influencing the economy’s 
resource constraint, while the receivers are indifferent between public and private 
redistribution. In the opposite extreme case where there is no warm glow of giving but a 
negative stigma effect of receiving donations, it follows from equation (19) that 
1 2ˆ 0g gv v  , 
i.e., an interior solution for charitable giving (if it exists) requires that the net marginal stigma 
cost is zero. To accomplish this, a 100 percent marginal subsidy rate is required here as well, 
although for a different reason.21 In the more interesting scenario with both warm glow and 
stigma effects, the optimal second-best policy is typically to subsidize charitable giving at a 
marginal rate of less than 100 percent or, if the net marginal stigma cost is large enough, tax 
charitable giving at the margin. 
 
By comparing equations (18a) and (20a), we can see that relative concerns affect the policy 
rule for marginal income taxation in a different way compared with the policy rule for 
marginal taxation/subsidization of charitable giving. While relative consumption concerns 
give rise to an externality-correcting motive for income taxation, which shows up as a direct 
effect in the policy rules for marginal income taxation, there is no such direct externality-
correcting charity tax in the absence of warm-glow and stigma effects. In our model, where 
all contributors to charity are identical, the only effect of the positional gift externality is to 
weaken (strengthen) the already existing incentive to subsidize (tax) charitable giving at the 
margin due to warm glow and stigma.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
and the utility gain of a subsidy on voluntary contributions by the highest income-earners leads to a relaxation of 
the self-selection constraint (as it makes it less attractive for them to become mimickers).  
21 At this marginal rate, and in the absence of a warm glow, the high-ability type would be indifferent between 
charitable giving and private consumption (suggesting that the subsidy rate must exceed 100 percent for infra-
marginal units to induce the desired level of gifts). 
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To see the intuition behind the tax treatment of positional gift externalities more clearly, 
consider the simplified case where there is neither an absolute warm-glow effect of giving nor 
an absolute stigma effect of receiving charitable donations, but where high-ability individuals 
still care about relative giving and low-ability ones care about relative stigma. It would then 
follow that i i ig g gu v u    and 0
i i
g gu v    for i=1,2. As a consequence, the social first-
order condition for charitable giving (equation [19]) would be redundant; in fact, it would 
always be satisfied since 1 0gv  , 
2 0gv  , and 
2ˆ 0gv   irrespective of the level of 
2g . Intuitively, 
if there is neither a warm glow motive to support charitable giving, nor a stigma motive to 
counteract it, there are no such welfare effects on which to base public policy either. This 
illustrates the importance of warm-glow and stigma effects for the rationale behind 
taxes/subsidies on charitable giving. 
 
3.3 Optimal Marginal Tax/Subsidy Rates for Charity with Transaction Costs 
Let us now turn to the general and more realistic version of the model set out above with 
transaction costs of charitable giving. Proceeding in the same way as before, we derive the 
following analogue to equation (19) with transaction costs: 
 
2 2 2 2 1 2 1ˆ( ) ( ) ( ) / 0g g g gv n g n v v n         . (22)  
Equation (22) thus shows that the social marginal utility of charitable giving by the high-
ability type, 
2( ) gv  , balances the marginal transaction cost as given by 
2 2( )gn g   plus the 
net marginal stigma cost, 
1 2ˆ( )g gv v . According to equation (22), in the presence of a 
marginal cost of giving, the optimal level of giving should be reduced compared with a 
situation where this marginal cost is nil (as in equation [19]). We can now derive: 
 
Proposition 2. With a positive marginal transaction cost of charitable giving, the optimal 
marginal tax/subsidy rate for charitable giving is by 
 
1 2
2 2
2 2
ˆ1 1
1 ( ) 1
(1 ) (1 )(1 )
g g
g gd
v v
T g
 

  
  
    
    
, (23a) 
In addition to the effects of charitable giving identified in Proposition 1, the positive marginal 
cost of charitable giving affects the optimal marginal tax/subsidy rate in the following ways: 
(i) If 
2
1
1 0
(1 )(1 )d

 

 
 
, a higher marginal transaction cost reduces the optimal marginal 
subsidy (increases the optimal marginal tax) on charitable giving, and 
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(ii) if 
2
1
1 0
(1 )(1 )d

 

 
 
, a higher marginal transaction cost increases the optimal 
marginal subsidy (reduces the optimal marginal tax) on charitable giving, ceteris paribus.  
(iii) In the leisure separable case, equation (23) simplifies to 
11 2
2 2
2 1 2
1
( ) 1
1 1
g
g g
c
v
T g
v
  

 
 
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 
.                (23b) 
   
Proof: See the Appendix.   
 
The first term on the right-hand side of equation (23a) is equivalent to its counterpart in 
equation (20), which we discussed at some length above, whereas the second term is novel 
and refers to the marginal transaction cost attached to charitable giving. In turn, this marginal 
transaction cost affects the optimal marginal subsidy/tax via two distinct mechanisms. First, 
since charitable giving necessitates resource use, and in order to attain a given optimal 
allocation, the marginal subsidy must be larger or the tax lower (in absolute terms) than 
without the transaction cost. This is captured by the second component in square brackets.  
 
Second, the marginal transaction cost also affects the marginal tax (subsidy) on charitable 
giving via the relative concerns about both consumption and giving, as expressed by the 
multiplier 2(1 ) / [(1 )(1 )]d     . As a consequence, by introducing a cost of giving, the 
optimal marginal subsidy/tax attached to charitable contributions will be adjusted in response 
to positional consumption externalities, which was not the case when this cost was nil (see 
Proposition 1). This is seen from the appearance of the average degree of consumption 
positionality,  , which is a measure of the marginal positional consumption externality per 
unit of consumption (recall that the relative consumption concerns are driven by mean-value 
comparisons). The average degree of positionality a  in the numerator of the multiplier, 
(1-a ) , contributes to increase the marginal subsidy (or decrease the marginal tax) on 
charitable giving, ceteris paribus. The intuition is that resources are lost in the process of 
charitable contributions. Therefore, a higher marginal subsidy or lower marginal tax shifts the 
households’ expenditure away from consumption and thus counteracts the positional 
consumption externality. The denominator 2[(1 )(1 )]d    either reinforces ( 0d  ) or 
counteracts ( 0
d  ) this effect depending on whether a potential mimicker is more or less 
positional in terms of consumption than the low-ability type. If the low-ability type is more 
positional than the mimicker ( 0
d  ), then decreased consumption contributes to relax the 
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self-selection constraint and thus reinforces the social benefit of a decrease in the positional 
consumption externality. Instead, if the mimicker is more positional than the low-ability type 
( 0d  ), increased consumption contributes to a relaxation of the self-selection constraint. 
Finally, the higher the high-ability individuals’ degree of positionality in charitable giving, 
2 , the lower the marginal subsidy (the higher the marginal tax) on charitable giving, as the 
government realizes that relative giving is pure waste.  
 
The components in square brackets in equation (23a) can be understood in terms of a 
discrepancy between the private and social marginal transaction cost of charitable giving, 
where the discrepancy depends on the externalities that relative concerns about consumption 
and donations give rise to. This discrepancy is relevant since the transaction cost means that 
charitable contributions will reduce the total resources available for private consumption, 
ceteris paribus. Consider first the special case where 0d  , i.e., where the mimicker and the 
low-ability type are equally consumption positional, in which case an increase in 
2( )g g  
contributes to increase (decrease) the right-hand side of equation (22) if 2 ( )   . This 
means that the larger the positional gift externality compared with the positional consumption 
externality, the more the marginal transaction cost of charitable giving will contribute to 
reduce the marginal subsidy (or increase the marginal tax) on charitable giving. The intuition 
is that the private marginal transaction cost underestimates its social counterpart if 2  , 
which the lower marginal subsidy or higher marginal tax serves to adjust for.22 An analogous 
interpretation in terms of increased marginal subsidies (or lower marginal taxation) of 
charitable giving follows when 2  . 
 
By relaxing the assumption that 0d  , we can also see that the more consumption positional 
the mimicker is relative to the low-ability type, i.e., the larger the d , the more 2( )g g  will 
underestimate the social marginal transaction cost of charitable giving. The intuition is that 
the government may in this case relax the self-selection constraint by a policy-induced 
increase in private consumption, meaning that increased charitable giving is associated with 
an additional cost for that particular reason. By analogy, if the low-ability type is more 
consumption positional than the mimicker, such that 0d  , increased charitable giving has 
                                                          
22 This result is further emphasized if we assume away the relative consumption comparisons completely such 
that 0  , in which case 
2
0   means that the second term on the right-hand side of equation (23) is 
positive. 
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the beneficial side effect of relaxing the self-selection constraint through a policy-induced 
decrease in private consumption, which motivates increased marginal subsidization (or 
decreased marginal taxation) of charitable giving at the margin. 
 
Finally, note that if 2 0d     , i.e., if neither consumption nor charitable giving were 
positional goods, then the second term on the right-hand side of equation (23a) would vanish. 
In this case, there is no longer any discrepancy between the private and social marginal 
transaction cost of charitable giving, meaning that there is no reason for the government to 
adjust the marginal subsidy/tax formula in response to the transaction cost. Equation (23a) 
will then coincide with equation (20a). 
 
4. Optimal Income Taxation without a Direct Instrument to Control Charitable Giving   
 
In the previous sections, we examined a case where the government is able to effectively 
control charitable giving through a direct tax or subsidy. Although this case is interesting and 
accords well with the idea that high-income consumers may have positional preferences for 
charitable giving, it is still not necessarily the case that the government is able to target these 
contributions perfectly through a direct tax instrument. One reason for this is, of course, that 
charitable contributions are not necessarily fully observable at the individual level. For 
example, individuals may have an incentive to exaggerate their charitable giving to benefit 
from the subsidy, or to underreport their contributions to avoid paying the tax. Furthermore, 
charitable giving is often organized by non-governmental entities with their own interests and 
incentives. Another reason is that the tax treatment of charitable giving might be politically 
controversial; in fact, several countries have chosen not to influence the level of charitable 
giving through direct tax incentives. Therefore, in this section, we analyze a scenario where 
the government is not able to influence the charitable giving through a direct instrument, i.e., 
the redistribution and correction policies are solely based on income taxation.23 To simplify 
the analysis, we abstract from the transaction cost of charitable giving addressed in 
Subsection 3.3, which is not essential for the main insights derived here.  
 
                                                          
23 An alternative might be to allow for an intermediate case, e.g., a limited form of tax deduction or an arbitrary 
marginal tax/subsidy. However, as long as the tax treatment of charitable contributions deviates from the flexible 
policy examined in the previous section, the incentive to affect the charitable contributions through marginal 
income taxation presented below will prevail. To characterize these tax policy incentives in the simplest possible 
way, we focus on the extreme case where the government lacks a direct instrument for taxing or subsidizing 
charitable giving. 
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4.1 Individual Behavior 
The tax function will now be written ( )i i iT T w l , as the tax payment (positive or negative) 
solely depends on the individual’s income. The budget constraints facing low-ability and 
high-ability individuals then become 
 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1( ) / 0w l T w l n g n c    ,       (24a) 
 
2 2 2 2 2 2( ) 0w l T w l g c     ,       (24b) 
respectively. The decision problem faced by the low-ability type takes exactly the same form 
as in the previous section, meaning that equation (5) still represents the first-order condition 
for work hours. For the high-ability type, the first-order condition for work hours in equation 
(5) also remains valid, while the first-order condition for charitable giving changes to read 
 
2 2 20 ( 0 if 0)c gu u g     .        (25) 
To be able to influence charitable giving through the income tax, the government may utilize 
that (25) implicitly defines charitable giving as a function of the private consumption and 
hours of work of the high-ability type. More specifically, if (25) holds as a strict equality, we 
can solve for 2g  as a function of 2c , 2z , c , and 
2g , i.e., 2 2 2 2 2( , , , )g g c z c g . By using 
2 2g g , we obtain the reduced form 
 2 2 2 2( , , )g g c z c .         (26) 
Equation (26) is interpretable as the reaction function for 2g  perceived by the government, 
since the government recognizes the relationship between 2g and 2g . In the general case, the 
comparative statics of equation (26) are ambiguous. To gain some additional insights and 
provide intuition, we also consider a simplified version of equation (26) based on a separable 
utility function for the high-ability type: 
             2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2( , , , , ) ( , ) ( ) ( ) ( )U v c z g c g v c z h g k c q g         ,    (27) 
where each sub-utility function is increasing in its respective argument and strictly concave, 
and consumption and leisure are weak (Edgeworth) complements such that 2 0czv  . Then, if 
2 0g  , (25) simplifies to 
  2 2 2 2 2( , ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0c c g gv c z k c h g q g        .     (28a) 
Totally differentiating and using 2 2g g  give 
(i)
2
2
0
g
c



,    (ii)
2
2
0
g
z



,    (iii)
2
0
g
c



.     (28b) 
The comparative statics in (28b) have straightforward interpretations. An increase in private 
consumption leads to decreased marginal utility of consumption, which in turn leads the 
 26 
individual to redirect spending toward more charitable giving, ceteris paribus. Increased use 
of leisure instead increases the marginal utility of consumption (by the assumption of 
complementary) and leads to increased private consumption and less charitable giving, ceteris 
paribus. Finally, since the individuals are positional in terms of consumption, it follows that 
an increase in the reference consumption increases the marginal utility of consumption, 
ceteris paribus, which leads to less charitable giving. 
 
4.2 The Government 
As in the previous sections, the government attempts to correct for positional externalities, 
emanating from both consumption and charitable giving, and also to redistribute between the 
two ability types. In this case, however, it lacks a direct instrument to subsidize or tax charity. 
By using 1 2 2 1/g n g n   and 1 2 2 1/g n g n   as before, the public decision problem is to 
choose 1l , 1c , 2l , and 2c  to maximize utility for the low-ability type while holding utility 
fixed for the high-ability type subject to the self-selection constraint and the resource 
constraint, implying that we can write the Lagrangean as  
 
1 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 1
( , , / , , / ) ( , , , , )
ˆ( , , , , ) ( ,1 , / , , / )
i i i i
i
L u c z n g n c n g n u c z g c g U
u c z g c g u c l n g n c n g n
n w l c

 

      
      
   
.  (29) 
However, 2g  is not a direct choice variable anymore and can therefore only be affected 
indirectly. It is here instead given by equation (26), i.e., 2 2 2 2( , , )g g c z c . We continue to 
assume that the mimicker does not contribute to charity, which is perhaps somewhat more 
questionable here, since the model no longer requires that charitable giving is observable to 
the government.24 For purposes of comparison, we would like to keep the model as close as 
possible to that of the previous section (except that the government can no longer directly 
control charitable giving), which means that we assume that the mimicker does not contribute 
to charity. 
 
The social first-order conditions can then be written as 
1l :   1 2 1 1ˆ 0z zu u n w      ,        (30) 
                                                          
24 On the one hand, the mimicker is no longer restricted in his/her contribution behavior and may therefore want 
to contribute to charitable giving. On the other hand, the mimicker is also a recipient of charity, and it may seem 
somewhat counterintuitive to contribute to and benefit from charitable giving at the same time. In addition, recall 
that the mimicker has the same income as the low-ability type.  
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1c :   
1
1 2 1ˆ 0c c c
n
u u n L
N
     ,        (31) 
2l :     2
2
2 2 2
2
0z g
g
u n w L
z
  

    

,       (32) 
2c :   2
2 2
2 2
2
( ) 0c c g
n g
u n L L
N c
  

    

.      (33) 
The social first-order conditions for 1l  and 1c , given by equations (30) and (31), take the 
same general form as in the previous section. Yet, as we will show below, the marginal 
income tax rate implemented for the low-ability type will differ from the policy implemented 
in the previous section due to interaction effects between the positional consumption and gifts 
externalities. In addition, the social first-order conditions for 2l  and 2c  in equations (32) and 
(33) are directly dependent on the welfare effect of charitable giving (through the partial 
derivative of the Lagrangean with respect to 2g ), since changes in the hours of work and 
private consumption of the high-ability type affect charitable giving through the reaction 
function given in equation (26). This will be discussed further below. 
 
To gain further insight into the implications of charitable giving for optimal income taxation, 
we differentiate the Lagrangean with respect to c  and 
2g , while using 2 2g g . This gives 
 
2
1 2 2ˆ( )c c c c g
g
L u u u L
c
  

    

 ,      (34a)  
 2 2
2 2 1 2 1ˆ( ) ( ) /g g gg gL u n u u n L       ,      (34b) 
where 
2
2 2 1 2 1ˆ( ) ( ) /g g ggL u n u u n      .       (34c) 
Recall from the previous section that i i i
c cu u  , 
2 2 2ˆˆ ˆ
c cu u  , and 
i i i
g gu u   for i=1,2. By 
using equations (31), (33), (34a), (34b), and (34c), we can then derive 
 
 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 1
2 2 1 2 1
ˆˆ( ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) /
ˆ( ) ( ) /
g g gg
g g g
L u n u u n
v n v v n
     
  
      
   
   (35a) 
  
2 2
2 2 1 2 1 2
2
1
ˆ( ) ( ) /
1 1
d
c g g g
g g
L N v n v v n
c c
 
    
 
   
       
    
. (35b) 
Note that the right-hand side of equation (35a) can be either positive or negative. It contains 
the components of the social first-order condition for 2g  derived in equation (19) in Section 2, 
although the two terms do not necessarily sum to zero here. The first term on the right-hand 
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side of equation (35b) is the direct partial welfare effect of increased reference consumption, 
which depends on the average degree of consumption positionality,  , and the difference in 
the degree of consumption positionality between the mimicker and the low-ability type, d  
(as defined in the previous section). We can see that the larger the  , the greater the welfare 
cost of increased reference consumption, ceteris paribus. This effect is, in turn, either 
reinforced ( 0d  ) or counteracted ( 0d  ) by an incentive to relax the self-selection 
constraint by exploiting that the mimicker and the low-ability type typically differ in terms of 
the degree of consumption positionality. 
  
The second term on the right-hand side of equation (35b) is an indirect welfare effect of 
increased reference consumption and arises because the two externalities interact through the 
reaction function for 2g  in equation (26). As such, this component depends on the social cost 
benefit rule for 2g  and would, of course, vanish in a setting where the government directly 
controls charitable giving, in which case the social first-order condition for 2g  would read 
2 2 1 2 1ˆ( ) ( ) / 0g g gv n v v n      , while the right-hand side of equation (35b) would reduce to 
( ) / (1 )dcL N       . The multiplier 
2 2 2 2/ /g c g c      reflects two different 
channels through which the two positional externalities interact. These channels are (i) a 
direct effect of c  on 
2g  and, therefore, on 2g , and (ii) a feedback effect because c  affects 
2c  through equation (33). The latter effect depends on the high-ability type’s degree of 
consumption positionality: the higher this degree, the stronger the feedback effect. According 
to the comparative statics based on the simplified utility function in equation (27), 
2 / 0g c    and 2 2/ 0g c   . Thus, the lower the high-ability type’s degree of consumption 
positionality, the more likely it is that 2 2 2 2/ /g c g c      is a negative number. 
 
We are now ready to derive the marginal income tax rates, which is accomplished by 
combining the social first-order conditions in equations (30)–(33) with the private first-order 
condition for labor supply in equation (5). The marginal income tax policy is summarized in 
Proposition 3. 
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Proposition 3. If the government lacks a direct instrument for controlling charitable giving, 
the optimal marginal income tax rates can be characterized as 
  
*
1 1 2 1
, , ,1 1 1
ˆ c
wl z c z c z c
L
T MRS MRS MRS
n w w N



   ,     (36a) 
 
2
2 2
2 2
, ,2 2 2 2 2
g ic
wl z c z c
LL g g
T MRS MRS
w N w n z c 
  
    
  
,     (36b) 
where * 2ˆ /cu   , ,
i
i z
z c i
c
u
MRS
u
  for i=1,2, and 
2
2
, 2
ˆˆ
ˆ
z
z c
c
u
MRS
u
 . 
 
Proof: See the Appendix. 
 
The low-ability type’s marginal income tax rate given in equation (36a) takes the same 
general form as in Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2008), with the modification that the 
welfare effect of increased reference consumption is now given by equation (35b). As a 
consequence, the sign of the second term on the right-hand side no longer depends only on the 
difference d   (as it did in Section 3), but also on whether an increase in 2g  leads to 
higher or lower social welfare. An analogous effect appears as the first term on the right-hand 
side in the marginal income tax formula for the high-ability type given in equation (36b). 
 
To provide intuition behind the tax policy implications of consumption positionality, and in 
particular the implications of the second term on the right-hand side of equation (35b), we add 
the (reasonable) assumption that d  , in which case the first term on the right-hand side of 
equation (35b) is negative, and then use the simplified utility function given in equation (27) 
and associated comparative statics in (28b). It follows that the partial welfare effect of 
increased reference consumption, as specified in equation (35b), is negative if 
 
2 2
2 2 1 2 1 2
2
ˆ( ) ( ) / 0g g g
g g
v n v v n
c c
   
  
       
,      (37) 
where 2 / 0g c    and 2 2/ 0g c    from (28b). Since the functional form assumption for 
the utility function implies 2 2 2/ /g c g c     , the sign of the term in square bracket 
depends on the high-ability type’s degree of consumption positionality. If this degree is 
sufficiently high, such that 2 2 2 2/ / 0g c g c      , the negative sign of (37) requires that 
charity is over-provided relative to the second-best optimal provision rule in Section 2, i.e., 
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2 2 1 2 1ˆ( ) ( ) /g g gv n v v n     . This exemplifies an incentive to increase the marginal income 
tax rates for both ability types that in turn leads to a smaller positional consumption 
externality as well as a simultaneous decrease in the level of charitable giving (both of which 
are desirable).  
 
Instead, if the high-ability type’s degree of consumption positionality is low enough such that 
2 2 2 2/ / 0g c g c      , and if we continue to assume that charitable giving is over-
provided in equilibrium relative to the second-best optimal policy rule, (37) will be replaced 
with 
 
2 2
2 2 1 2 1 2
2
ˆ( ) ( ) / 0g g g
g g
v n v v n
c c
   
  
     
  
.      (38) 
In this case, the two terms on the right-hand side of equation (35b) differ in sign (under the 
assumption that d  ), meaning that the marginal tax policy implication of the positional 
consumption externality is ambiguous (since a decrease in this externality would lead to an 
increase in the already over-provided charitable giving). 
 
Policy implications opposite to those just discussed would follow if charitable giving were 
under-provided in equilibrium relative to the second-best optimal policy rule, i.e., if 
2 2 1 2 1ˆ( ) ( ) /g g gv n v v n     .  
 
The second term on the right-hand side of equation (36b) is also novel and arises because the 
high-ability type’s labor supply and consumption choices directly affect the charitable giving 
and, therefore, the tax policy incentives. Note first that this effect has nothing to do with 
consumption positionality (i.e., it would be present also in a model without consumption 
positionality where 0cL  ). To provide intuition, consider once again the simplified utility 
function with comparative statics in (28b), in which case 
2 2
2
,2 2
0z c
g g
MRS
z c
 
 
 
.         (39) 
With (39) at our disposal, it follows that the second term on the right-hand side of equation 
(36b) constitutes an incentive to tax high-ability labor at the margin if 
2 2 1 2 1ˆ( ) ( ) /g g gv n v v n     . In this scenario, the high-ability type over-provides charitable 
donations relative to the policy rule ideally preferred by the government in equation (19). 
Therefore, by reducing the high-ability type’s labor supply and disposable income, less will 
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be spent on charitable giving. If instead 2 2 1 2 1ˆ( ) ( ) /g g gv n v v n     , meaning that the high-
ability type under-provides charitable donations in equilibrium, there is an analogous 
incentive to reduce the marginal income tax rate facing the high-ability type. The intuition is 
that lower marginal income taxation leads to increased charitable giving, which is desirable as 
long as giving falls below the level implied by equation (19).  
 
Finally, note that equation (36a) and (36b) would coincide with equation (18a) and (18b) if 
2
2 2 1 2 1ˆ( ) ( ) / 0g g ggL v n v v n       , 
i.e., if the marginal welfare contribution of charitable giving is zero at the optimum. This 
would be the case if the government were able to control the charitable donations through a 
direct instrument, as in Sections 2 and 3. Therefore, the fact that charitable giving is no longer 
necessarily at the socially optimal level (due to the lack of such an instrument) is the source of 
discrepancy between the policy rules for marginal income taxation given in equations (36) 
and those presented in Section 3. 
 
5. Numerical Simulations 
 
In this section, we simulate numerical versions of the models set out and examined in 
Sections 3 and 4. This makes it possible to quantify the importance of various mechanisms 
characterizing the policy rules for marginal taxation presented above. It also enables us to go 
beyond the policy rules by analyzing the levels of marginal taxation, and the overall 
redistribution policy. The main aim is to examine (i) how the two versions of the model (i.e., 
with and without a direct tax instrument for controlling charitable giving) differ in terms of 
marginal tax and redistribution policy and (ii) how the optimal tax and redistribution policies 
vary with key parameters of the model. 
 
5.1 Numerical Model 
Note that the policy rules for marginal taxation presented in Sections 3 and 4 are necessary 
conditions for maximizing any social welfare function that fulfills the Pareto criterion, as long 
as it is consistent with the assumption that the policy maker redistributes from the high-ability 
to the low-ability type. Furthermore, we did not make any specific assumption about the 
functional form of the individual utility functions. However, when examining the levels of 
marginal and average taxation, and to be able to quantify the overall redistribution policy, we 
must specify both the individual utility functions and the social welfare function.  
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We assume that all individuals share a common utility function, characterized by the same 
degree of consumption positionality for all equal to  , as well as a common degree of gift 
positionality equal to  . We also assume that individuals derive additional utility from giving 
if, and only if, their own consumption level (or net income) is larger than the consumption 
level of the recipients. Therefore, only high-ability individuals may donate, and only low-
ability individuals will potentially receive charitable donations. 
 
The utility related to the warm glow of donating for individual i is given by 
ln( ( ))
iiM D give give   , where D is a dummy variable taking the value 1 when the 
receiver has a lower consumption level than oneself and zero otherwise. The corresponding 
disutility of receiving donations for individual i then becomes ln( )
iiM receive receive   . 
In equilibrium, only the high-ability individuals will potentially give donations and the low-
ability individuals potentially receive such donations, meaning that the utility functions facing 
the two types can be written as follows:25 
1 1 1 1 1ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( )U c c z M M g g           ,   (40a) 
 2 2 2 2 2ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( )U c c z M g g M           .  (40b) 
Note that these utility functions are leisure separable according to equation (3). Consider first 
the case where the government can control the charitable giving through a direct instrument. 
Based on equations (40), and by assuming that the resource cost of charitable giving takes the 
form 2 2( )g g   for 0   , the private first-order conditions become26 
  
1
1 1 1
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1zc wl
c c
MRS w T
z
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
   ,  (41a) 
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c c
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.  (41c) 
By analogy to equation (41c), we can derive the marginal rate of substitution between gifts 
and private consumption for the low-ability type: 
                                                          
25 Similar functional form assumptions are used in other literature on optimal taxation under social comparisons; 
see Kanbur and Tuomala (2013) and Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2018). The latter study assumes a 
difference comparison, as we have done, whereas the former instead assumes a ratio comparison form. 
26 It is not entirely clear to us whether the cost of charitable giving should be concave (as we assume) or convex 
(which is the conventional assumption for cost functions). We base our formulation on the assumption that the 
initial cost of searching among presumptive charities is the main mechanism behind this cost. 
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1
1
1 1gc
c c
MRS
M g g





 
.  (42) 
Note that M must be large enough such that low-ability individuals accept donations at a zero 
donation level, i.e., such that 1 1gxMRS   when 
2 0g  , in turn implying 1( )M c c    in 
equilibrium. It must also be small enough to ensure that high-ability individuals are willing to 
donate at a zero donation level, i.e., 2 1gxMRS   for 
2 0g  , in turn implying that 
2( )M c c    in equilibrium. 
 
If the government cannot control charitable giving through a direct instrument, the private 
first-order conditions for work hours remain as above, while equation (41c) is replaced with 
 
2
2 2 0.5
2 2
1 0.5 ( )gc
c c
MRS g
M g g

 

  
 
.    (43) 
Therefore, by using 2 2g g , equation (43) implicitly defines  2g  as a function of 2c  and c , 
which constitutes the reaction function through which the government may influence the 
charitable giving via the income tax. 
 
Turning to the optimal tax problem, we follow much earlier literature in assuming a utilitarian 
social welfare function: 
1 1 2 2W n U n U  .          (44)  
The self-selection and resource constraints can be written as: 
2 2 2 2
1 1 2 2 2 1
ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( )
ln( ) ln(1 ) ln( ) ln( ( ) / )
c c z M g g M
c c l M M g g n n
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     
     
       
,    (45) 
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i i
n w l n c n g
 
    ,         (46) 
where we have used 1 2 2 1/g n g n  . In the version of the model where the government can 
control the charitable giving through a direct tax instrument, the social decision-problem is to 
choose 1l , 1c , 
2l , 2c , and 2g  to maximize the social welfare function given in equation (44) 
subject to the self-selection and resource constraints in equations (45) and (46). In doing so, 
the government (or social planner) also recognizes that the two reference measures are 
endogenous and given by (1/ ) i i
i
c N n c   and 2 2g g , respectively. By analogy, if the 
government lacks a direct tax instrument for controlling charitable giving, the social decision-
problem is to choose 1l , 1c , 
2l , and 2c  to maximize the social welfare function subject to the 
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same self-selection and resource constraints, and subject to the reaction function for 2g  
implicitly defined by equation (43). 
 
5.2 Baseline Simulation Results 
In the baseline setting, we assume a substantial productivity differential between the types and 
that the degrees of positionality are relatively modest (equal to 0.2 for both consumption and 
charitable giving). The baseline parameters are the following: a = 0.2 , b = 0.2 , e = 0.5 , 
h = 0.4 ,s = 0.4 , 0.4  ,  5M  , 1 0.8n  , 2 0.2n  , 1 15w  , and 2 60w  . Average income 
tax rates will be denoted 1T  (for low-ability individuals) and 2T  (for high-ability 
individuals); all other notations are the same as above. 
 
Table 1 Baseline Results 
1a) Direct instrument for controlling charitable giving 
1c  2c  2g  1l  2l  1
wlT  
2
wlT  
1T  2T  
2
gT  
15.29 22.19 3.39 0.56 0.84 0.27 0.20 -0.71 0.48 -0.16 
 
 
1b) No direct instrument for controlling charitable giving 
1c  2c  2g  1l  2l  1
wlT  
2
wlT  
1T  2T  Shadow value of 
2g : 2gL  
15.13 23.16 2.24 0.57 0.84 0.28 0.17 -0.72 0.48 0.11 
 
 
In both parts of Table 1, we can observe a sizable redistribution through income taxes. Indeed, 
the average tax is around -70 percent for low-ability individuals (and about 50 percent for 
high-ability individuals), meaning that they will receive about 0.7 USD as a tax transfer per 
dollar earned; yet, their marginal tax rate is positive and equal to 27–28 per cent. Furthermore, 
despite that a first-best tax policy would equalize the consumption across individuals – due to 
the functional form assumptions for the individual utility functions and the social welfare 
function – the second-best allocation portrayed here implies a substantial inequality measured 
in terms of consumption, although it is substantially smaller than in terms of the before-tax 
wage rates. Thus, the self-selection constraint effectively reduces the scope for redistribution. 
Nevertheless, given this level of governmental redistribution through taxes, Table 1a shows 
that it is still optimal to subsidize charitable giving, with a subsidy rate of 16 percent. The 
resulting redistribution through charity is also far from negligible. 
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Table 1b illustrates the case where the government lacks a direct instrument for influencing 
charitable donations (implying of course that 
2 0gT  ) and presents results reminiscent of 
those in Table 1a, but with two important exceptions. First, without a direct instrument for 
influencing charitable giving, these donations are smaller at the optimum. In turn, this means 
that the high-ability individuals consume more and the low-ability individuals consume less in 
Table 1b than in Table 1a. Therefore, a full set of instruments allows for more redistribution 
without violating the self-selection constraint.  
 
Second, and more interestingly, the marginal income tax rate implemented for the high-ability 
type is lower here than in Table 1a. The intuition is that the charitable giving is under-
provided relative to the policy rule ideally preferred by the government, implying that the 
government now uses the marginal income tax faced by the high-ability type as an indirect 
instrument for increasing the level of charitable giving. This mechanism is illustrated in 
equation (36b): since the shadow value of charitable giving 2 0gL   in Table 1b (meaning that 
increased charitable giving leads to higher social welfare, ceteris paribus), the second term on 
the right-hand side of equation (36) is negative and thus contributes to a lower marginal 
income tax rate. Note that this mechanism is absent in the simulation results presented in 
Table 1a, where the government has a direct instrument for influencing the charitable giving 
and uses this instrument such that 2 0gL  . 
 
We would, nevertheless, like to point out that the marginal and average income tax policies 
are quite similar in Tables 1a and 1b, despite that the direct tax/subsidy instrument for 
charitable giving is absent in the simulations underlying Table 1b. In other words, the 
benchmark simulations imply that the marginal income tax policies and overall redistribution 
are not very sensitive to whether the government can control the charitable giving through a 
direct instrument. This suggests that the marginal income tax is a somewhat weak instrument 
from the perspective of targeting charitable contributions, which is further emphasized by the 
discrepancy between Tables 1a and 1b regarding the level of these donations.  
 
5.3 Sensitivity Analyses 
In this subsection, we present a number of sensitivity analyses to examine how the results of 
the benchmark simulations will change in response to variations in the degree of consumption 
positionality,  , the degree of gifts positionality,  , the measure of stigma attached to 
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charitable donations,  , and the relative wage rate, 2 1/w w , respectively. Variations in each 
such parameter will be addressed in turn, where the other parameters take the same values as 
in the benchmark model. 
 
Table 2. Varying the degree of consumption positionality,    
2a) Direct instrument for controlling charitable giving 
  1c  2c  2g  1l  2l  1
wlT  
2
wlT  
1T  2T  
2
gT  
0 14.94 23.57 3.39 0.56 0.84 0.09 0 -0.67 0.45 0.09 
0.05 15.03 23.22 3.39 0.56 0.84 0.14 0.05 -0.68 0.46 0.03 
0.25 15.37 21.84 3.39 0.56 0.84 0.28 0.25 -0.72 0.48 -0.22 
0.45 15.72 20.46 3.39 0.56 0.84 0.50 0.45 -0.77 0.51 -0.46 
0.65 16.06 19.08 3.39 0.56 0.84 0.68 0.65 -0.81 0.54 -0.71 
0.85 16.41 17.70 3.39 0.56 0.84 0.86 0.85 -0.85 0.56 -0.95 
 
2b) No direct instrument for controlling charitable giving 
  1c  2c  2g  1l  2l  1
wlT  
2
wlT  
1T  2T  Shadow value of 
2g : 2gL  
0 15.04 23.02 3.98 0.56 0.84 0.09 0.02 -0.67 0.45 -0.05 
0.05 15.06 23.06 3.57 0.56 0.84 0.14 0.06 -0.68 0.45 -0.01 
0.25 15.16 23.21 1.75 0.57 0.84 0.32 0.20 -0.73 0.49 0.15 
0.45 15.51 23.13 0 0.58 0.84 0.51 0.34 -0.79 0.54 0 
0.65 15.98 20.67 0 0.57 0.84 0.69 0.60 -0.86 0.59 0 
0.85 16.39 18.32 0 0.57 0.83 0.87 0.84 -0.92 0.63 0 
 
Tables 2a and 2b show that the marginal income tax rates increase with the degree of 
consumption positionality, which is in line with earlier studies on optimal nonlinear income 
taxation under relative consumption concerns based on numerical models (e.g., Kanbur and 
Tuomala, 2013; Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman, 2018). As implied by equation (18), the 
marginal income tax rate implemented for the high-ability type always equals the common 
degree of consumption positionality in Table 2a, since there is no discrepancy in the degree of 
positionality between the mimicker and the low-ability type when the utility function takes 
the form of equation (40). The marginal income tax rate facing the low-ability type 
analogously exceeds the common degree of consumption positionality due to that marginal 
taxation of low-ability individuals also constitutes a means of relaxing the self-selection 
constraint (by exploiting that a potential mimicker and mimicked agent differ in terms of the 
 37 
marginal valuation of leisure). Another distinguishing feature is that the redistribution among 
consumer types increases substantially with the degree of consumption positionality. 
 
We can also note from Table 2a that the optimal marginal subsidy for charitable giving 
increases with the degree of consumption positionality. In fact, when   increases from zero, 
2
gT  goes from a positive number (a marginal tax) to a negative number (marginal subsidy). As 
shown in the theoretical section, there are two simultaneous forces at work here. First, the 
higher the  , the lower the marginal willingness to pay among low-ability individuals to 
avoid stigma. Second, positionality in private consumption induces the high-ability type to 
overestimate the social marginal cost of charitable giving (and for this reason to spend less 
resources on charity), which also contributes to increase the marginal subsidy. 
 
Finally, the marginal and average tax rates, as well as the distribution of consumption, are 
qualitatively similar regardless of whether the government can control the charitable giving 
through a direct instrument. 
 
Table 3 Varying the degree of gifts positionality,   
3a) Direct instrument for controlling charitable giving 
  1c  2c  2g  1l  2l  1
wlT  
2
wlT  
1T  2T  
2
gT  
0 15.33 22.12 2.83 0.56 0.84 0.27 0.20 -0.74 0.49 -0.19 
0.20 15.29 22.19 3.39 0.56 0.84 0.29 0.20 -0.71 0.48 -0.16 
0.40 15.23 22.30 4.22 0.56 0.84 0.28 0.20 -0.68 0.45 -0.11 
0.60 15.14 20.50 5.53 0.56 0.84 0.28 0.20 -0.63 0.42 -0.04 
0.80 14.89 23.18 6.51 0.57 0.83 0.29 0.20 -0.56 0.38 0.16 
 
3b) No direct instrument for controlling charitable giving 
  1c  2c  2g  1l  2l  1
wlT  
2
wlT  
1T  2T  Shadow value of 
2g : 2gL  
0 15.13 23.32 1.70 0.57 0.84 0.28 0.16 -0.73 0.49 0.16 
0.20 15.06 23.16 2.24 0.57 0.84 0.28 0.17 -0.72 0.48 0.11 
0.40 15.12 22.97 3.14 0.56 0.84 0.28 0.18 -0.69 0.47 0.05 
0.60 15.10 22.74 4.95 0.56 0.84 0.28 0.19 -0.64 0.43 0.01 
0.80 15.02 22.37 10.40 0.56 0.84 0.29 0.22 -0.47 0.32 -0.02 
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We can see from Table 3a that none of the marginal income tax rates are very sensitive to 
changes in the degree of gifts positionality. The reason is that the government has a perfect 
instrument for influencing charitable giving (by construction of the model), meaning that the 
positionality in donations does not directly affect the policy rules for marginal income 
taxation. Therefore, the marginal income tax rate facing the high-ability type remains constant 
and equal to the degree of consumption positionality, while the marginal income tax rate 
implemented for the low-ability type varies slightly due to that a change in   may either 
tighten or relax the self-selection constraint. 
 
In Table 3a, the optimal marginal subsidy for charitable donations decreases in response to an 
increase in   and eventually turns into a marginal tax. An increase in   means that a larger 
fraction of the high-ability type’s marginal utility of charitable giving is social waste and that 
there is a greater tendency for the high-ability type to underestimate the social marginal cost 
of charitable giving. Both of these effects work to decrease the marginal subsidy for such 
donations. In Table 3b, where the simulations are based on the assumption that the 
government cannot directly tax or subsidize charitable contributions, the analogous (albeit 
indirect) policy response is to increase the marginal income tax rate facing the high-ability 
type to weaken the incentive for charitable contributions as   increases. The pattern of the 
average tax rates and distribution of consumption is similar across the two parts of the table: 
the government redistributes less via the tax system when the charitable donations increase. 
 
Table 4 Variation in the marginal disutility of receiving charitable donations,   
4a) Direct instrument for controlling charitable giving 
  1c  2c  2g  1l  2l  1
wlT  
2
wlT  
1T  2T  
2
gT  
0.1 16.83 16.33 37.26 0.55 0.89 0.19 0.20 0.09 -0.06 -0.89 
0.3 15.66 20.86 6.58 0.56 0.85 0.25 0.20 -0.67 0.44 -0.41 
0.5 14.95 23.40 1.40 0.56 0.83 0.29 0.20 -0.73 0.49 0.10 
 
4b) No direct instrument to controlling charitable giving 
  1c  2c  2g  1l  2l  1
wlT  
2
wlT  
1T  2T  Shadow value of 
2g : 2gL  
0.1 15.31 24.49 2.94 0.58 0.86 0.25 -0.04 -0.68 0.45 0.66 
0.3 15.20 23.57 2.46 0.57 0.85 0.27 0.11 -0.71 0.46 0.28 
0.5 15.05 22.77 2.02 0.56 0.83 0.29 0.22 -0.73 0.49 -0.06 
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Table 4a shows that the size of the donation per high-ability individual and the marginal 
subsidy for donations fall substantially when the stigma attached to receiving charitable 
donations increases. If the stigma is sufficiently high (represented by 0.5   in the table), 
charitable giving should be taxed at the margin. In Table 4b, the analogous policy response is 
to increase the marginal income tax rate implemented for the high-ability type when the 
stigma attached to charitable contributions increases. Here, the co-variation between the 
charitable contributions and   is much smaller than in Table 4a, indicating once again that 
marginal income taxation is not an effective means of influencing charitable giving. 
 
Table 5. Variation in the relative wage rate, 2 1/w w , where 1 15w   
 
5a) Direct instrument for controlling charitable giving 
2 1/w w  1c  2c  2g  1l  2l  1
wlT  
2
wlT  
1T  2T  
2
gT  
3 13.50 19.10 2.44 0.62 0.82 0.27 0.20 -0.39 0.40 -0.23 
4 15.29 22.19 3.39 0.56 0.84 0.27 0.20 -0.71 0.48 -0.16 
6 18.93 28.25 4.52 0.45 0.87 0.28 0.20 -1.63 0.57 0 
8 22.62 34.24 5.20 0.34 0.88 0.29 0.20 -3.16 0.61 0.17 
10 26.32 40.20 5.61 0.23 0.89 0.29 0.20 -6.18 0.65 0.34 
 
5b) No direct instrument for controlling charitable giving 
2 1/w w  1c  2c  2g  1l  2l  1
wlT  
2
wlT  
1T  2T  Shadow value of 
2g : 
2g
L  
3 13.35 21.02 0.79 0.63 0.83 0.26 0.06 -0.40 0.40 0.01 
4 15.13 23.16 2.24 0.57 0.84 0.28 0.17 -0.72 0.48 0.11 
6 18.93 28.24 4.53 0.45 0.87 0.28 0.20 -1.63 0.57 0 
8 22.85 32.99 6.51 0.34 0.88 0.28 0.23 -3.21 0.61 -0.07 
10 26.82 37.45 8.32 0.22 0.89 0.28 0.25 -6.51 0.65 -0.12 
 
According to Tables 5a and 5b, an increased wage differential reduces the hours of work for 
the low-ability type and increases the hours of work for the high-ability type. At the same 
time, the tax system becomes more redistributive (as seen by the average tax rates). The 
charitable donation per high-ability individual increases with the relative wage, i.e., the more 
productive the high-ability type relative to the low-ability type, the larger the donation will be 
in absolute value. Note also from Table 5a that the donations increase when the relative wage 
rate increases, while the marginal subsidy for these donations decreases and eventually turns 
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into a marginal tax. In the absence of a direct instrument for influencing charitable giving, we 
can see from the final column of Table 5b that the charitable giving is under-provided 
(relative to the policy rule ideally preferred by the government) for moderate wage 
differentials and over-provided for high wage differentials. The latter explains why the 
charitable giving is more sensitive to variation in the relative wage rate in Table 5b than in 
Table 5a (where the charitable giving satisfies the social first-order condition given in 
equation [22]).  
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Taking the rapidly increased inequality in many countries as the point of departure, this paper 
analyzes the optimal tax policy implications of private redistribution through charitable giving 
from richer to poorer individuals based on a two-type model of optimal nonlinear income 
taxation. We consider a rich behavioral model where receiving charity is associated with a 
stigma effect, while potential givers are motivated not only by warm glow but also by status 
concerns. The latter means that donors derive utility from giving more than referent others. 
Furthermore, since charitable giving reflects a tradeoff between donations and private 
consumption, status concerns with respect to consumption are not only relevant from the 
perspective of income taxation; they are also directly relevant for tax policies aimed at 
influencing charitable donations. Consequently, in our study, both the consumption and 
charitable giving choices (partly) reflect social comparisons, which also accords well with 
empirical evidence.   
 
An important take-home message of the paper is that the warm glow of giving and stigma of 
receiving charity play crucial roles for whether charitable giving should be subsidized or 
taxed at the margin. In a first-best resource allocation, where the self-selection constraint does 
not bind, and in the absence of any transaction cost of charitable contributions, a necessary 
condition for subsidizing charity at the margin is that givers experience a warm glow. Yet, in 
a second-best resource allocation with a binding self-selection constraint, it may be optimal to 
subsidize charitable giving at the margin also in the absence of any warm glow, since the 
stigma effect of receiving charity contributes to relax the self-selection constraint. When 
introducing transaction costs of charitable giving in the model, we find that the marginal 
transaction cost contributes to marginal subsidization (taxation) of charitable giving if the 
positional consumption externality exceeds (falls short of) the positional gift externality. The 
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intuition is that these externalities lead to a discrepancy between the public and private 
marginal cost of charitable giving. Overall, and based on our analysis, there are cases both for 
taxing and for subsidizing charitable giving.  
 
We also characterize the optimal marginal income tax policy in a more restrictive – albeit 
empirically relevant – case where the government lacks a direct instrument for taxing or 
subsidizing charitable giving, and derived conditions under which this results in higher or 
lower marginal income taxes implemented for both ability types. Whether this additional 
restriction motivates higher or lower marginal income tax rates (compared with the more 
general model with a full set of tax instruments) largely depends on whether it leads to over- 
or under-provision of charitable giving relative to the policy rule ideally preferred by the 
government. 
 
The numerical analysis supports the theoretical results derived in Sections 3 and 4 as well as 
quantifies the mechanisms driving the optimal tax structure in general and the optimal tax 
treatment of charitable giving in particular. While the baseline simulation suggests that 
charitable giving should be subsidized at the margin, variation in key parameters confirms 
that there are cases where charitable giving ought to be subsidized at the margin and cases 
where it ought to be taxed. For instance, by increasing the parameter reflecting the social 
stigma of receiving charity, while holding the other parameters constant, the marginal subsidy 
rapidly declines and turns, eventually, into a marginal tax. A similar result follows through 
(ceteris paribus) increases in the degree of gifts positionality, where charitable giving 
becomes more and more wasteful from society’s point of view. The opposite effects emerge 
from variation in the degree of consumption positionality, where very low levels of this 
degree may motivate taxation of charitable giving, while higher levels (some of which are in 
accordance with empirical evidence) motivate subsidization. Another important insight from 
our analysis is that both versions of the numerical model, i.e., the one with a full set of tax 
instruments and the one where the government lacks a direct instrument for influencing the 
level of charitable giving, result in very similar allocations in terms of consumption and work 
hours. In fact, the results from these two models primarily differ in the level of charitable 
giving with a corresponding adjustment in terms of the average income tax rates. This 
suggests that (i) the income tax alone can accomplish roughly the same redistribution as can 
be accomplished under a mix of taxes on income and charitable giving, although at a higher 
social cost, and that (ii) the income tax alone constitutes a very weak instrument for 
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influencing the level of charitable giving. 
 
Although the present paper has generalized previous research in many ways, the results of 
course still depend on the strong assumptions made in order to be able to understand the key 
mechanisms involved. For example, whereas we have relied on a two-type model, a 
generalization to a model with many ability-types (or a model with a continuous ability 
distribution) would be more complex and require additional assumptions, in particular with 
respect to both tails of the ability distribution. By way of illustration, assuming that people 
would prefer to give to those with the lowest-income level, this would induce individuals of 
the second-lowest income level to mimic the lowest one, in turn implying potential optimal 
bunching at the lowest income level (i.e., also for the case where the lowest ability-type 
chooses to work at the optimum). Such mechanisms are important, both theoretically and of 
course even more so when modifying actual tax systems in practice, and deserve further 
attention in future research. Still, the key insights from the mechanisms analyzed here would 
still prevail.  
 
Similarly, in our model there is only one type of voluntary contribution, whereas in reality 
there are many different types of charitable giving with different implications. It would be 
straightforward to generalize our model to several types of charitable giving as long as this 
giving is fully observable, such that different types of charitable giving can be treated 
differently by the tax system. The realistic case with imperfect observability of charitable 
giving is also an important question for future research.   
 
Let us finally return to the initial questions whether a favorable tax treatment of redistributive 
charitable giving from the rich to the poor is an adequate way of dealing with the increasing 
inequalities observed in many countries, and more generally how such giving should be 
treated by the tax system. Not surprisingly, as demonstrated in the present paper, these 
questions have no unambiguous answers. Yet, there are clearer conditional answers, which 
depend on the relative importance of the warm glow of giving versus the stigma of receiving 
charity, how much the warm glow of giving depends on giving more than others, and the size 
of the transaction costs (in a broad sense) of charitable giving. Another important task for 
future research is therefore to obtain more empirical evidence of these factors.  
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Appendix 
 
Derivation of Equation (18a) 
Consider first the low-ability type. From equation (12) we can derive 
1 1 1 2 1 1
,
ˆ( )z c c c zMRS v v v n w    .       (A1) 
Equation (10) implies 
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Combining equations (A1) and (A2) yields 
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where in the last step we have used the private optimum condition for labor supply, i.e., 
equation (5). From equation (1) follows that for each type (including the mimicker) 
( )i i i ic c cv v v   ,         (A4) 
which substituted into equation (15) implies 
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Note also that equation (11) can be rearranged such that 
2
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Substituting equations (A2) and (A6) into equation (A5) yields 
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where we have used equation (16). Solving for the optimal marginal income tax rate in 
equation (3) and substituting equation (A7) then imply 
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where   
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is the policy rule for marginal income taxation for type 1 individuals in the original Stiglitz 
(1982) model, in which there are no relative consumption concerns. Let us finally again use 
the private optimum condition, equation (5), in equation (A8) in order to obtain 
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Solving for 1
wlT  and re-arranging gives equation (18a) for type 1 individuals. Equation (18) for 
type 2 individuals is derived similarly, in which 2 0  . 
 
Proof of Propositions 1 and 2 
Consider first the proof of Proposition 2. From the individual optimum condition for charity, 
equation (6), it follows that 
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(A10) 
where we used equation (17) in the last step. By using the social first-order condition for 
charitable giving in equation (14), we can then derive 
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.                (A11) 
The social first-order condition for consumption among type 2 individuals, equation (11), 
implies 
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Substituting equations (A11) and (A12) into equation (A10) then gives 
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Let us finally eliminate 1n . Solving equation (10) for 1n  gives 
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Now, using 1 1 1 1/ (1 )c c cv v v     and 
2 2 2 2ˆˆ ˆ ˆ / (1 )c c cv v v    , and then collecting the 
1n -
terms, equation (A14) can be written as 
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Substituting equation (A15) into equation (A13) gives equation (23) in Proposition 2. 
Equation (20) in Proposition 1 follows as the special case where
2( ) 0g g  .∎ 
 
Proof of Proposition 3  
Consider first the marginal income tax formula for the low-ability type. Combining equations 
(30) and (31) gives 
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By using 1 1 1 1 1/z c wlw u u w T   in equation (A16) and then solving for 
1
wlT , we can derive 
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which is equation (36a). 
 
Turning to the marginal income tax formula for the high-ability type, we can similarly 
combine equations (32) and (33) to derive 
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Using 2 2 2 2 2/z c wlw u u w T   in equation (A18) and solving for 
2
wlT  gives 
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which is equation (36b).∎ 
 
To derive equation (35b), we use i i i
c cu u   for i=1,2 and 
2 2 2ˆˆ ˆ
c cu u  . Substituting into 
equation (34a) gives 
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Solving equation (31) for 1
cu  and equation (33) for 
2( ) cu  , respectively, such that 
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and substituting into equation (A20) implies 
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Collecting cL -terms and rearranging gives 
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Finally, by using the expression for 2gL  in equation (35a) and substituting into equation (A22), 
we obtain equation (35b). 
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